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Up until Obergefell, a traditional pro-marriage ideology was used in justifying 
homophobic laws and the entrenched sexism of traditional marriages.  Inside and outside 
of courthouses, those who opposed same-sex marriage often did so by citing to 
inflammatory and faulty studies that suggested the most notable injury to a child—
criminal activity for the boys, sexual promiscuity and adult-poverty for the girls, and a 
heightened risk of child molestation for both—arose exclusively from not having proper 
gendered parent figures in the home.4   
The evidence upon which these assertions were made—and vigorously defended 
by state attorneys general in courtrooms—has now been debunked.5   
But I do think that the proponents of traditional marriage were correct in asserting 
that the institution of marriage has benefits that no other relationship currently provides 
to its members.  Put another way, although those who defended traditional marriage were 
wrong with respect to their political agenda, what if they in fact were absolutely right in 
asserting that there is something of great value in the institution of marriage?   
Part I explores how, in the past 40 years, the state purpose in marriage was 
fundamentally redefined from a societal interest in procreation to an individual right to 
and school failure.”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children's Right to Their 
Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011) (criticizing “intentional single parenting and parenting by 
same-sex couples, two recent popular relationship lifestyle trends” for their adverse impact on children). 
3 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 244–45 (2001) 
(“The concept of marriage, and the assumptions it carries with it, limit development of family policy and 
distort our ideology. . . . I argue that for all relevant and appropriate societal purposes we do not need 
marriage, per se, at all.”); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2686 
(2008) (“What I argue in this essay is that post-Lawrence efforts to secure marriage equality for same-sex 
couples must be undertaken, at a minimum, in a way that is compatible with efforts to dislodge marriage 
from its normatively superior status as compared with other forms of human attachment, commitment, and 
desire.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex 
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 573 (2005) (“Both opponents and proponents of 
same-sex marriage champion the well-being of children. . . . I urge supporters to base their right-to-marry 
arguments on equality and, when considering the interests of children, to advocate for the social and legal 
supports necessary for optimal child outcomes in all families.”). 
4 For an overview of the arguments raised and criticisms of the proffered evidence, see Kari E. Hong, 
Parens Patri(Archy): Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003) 
(examining the policies behind states that passed laws to prevent same-sex couples to foster and adopt 
children on the basis that those children are harmed by the lack of traditional gender roles in those families.  
The article cites in detail the evidence, testimony, and briefing that the States used to justify these bans 
along with same-sex marriage bans.).  
5 See generally Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J.) (rejecting—and at times 
mocking—claims of harm purported caused by same-sex marriage); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 
2d 921, 991–95, 997–1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (after a 12-day trial with 19 witnesses, the federal district court 
made 80 findings of fact that concluded that no compelling state interest justified denying same-sex couples 
the right to marry) vacated on other grounds and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652, 186 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2013); see also Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal Benefits, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1470 (2013) (challenging claims that marriage promotes responsible procreation 
among heterosexual couples). 
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self-determination.  Prior to Griswold v. Connecticut’s privacy protections, the 50 states 
very much policed sex that occurred both inside and outside of marriages.6 
 
As the scaffolding of the criminalization of sex fell, the state interest in marriage 
was largely unarticulated until the 2003 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
decision.7  In the first case that affirmatively that extended protections to same-sex 
couples, the Massachusetts court no longer claimed that marriage was a hallowed 
institution that perpetuated civilization.  Nonetheless, it too claimed that the private event 
of falling in love aggregated into a larger public project.  Specifically, the intimate 
decision of choosing—or not choosing—a partnership with another became a critical act 
of self-realization and when chosen, an ability to share a common humanity with the 
larger population.   
 
Marriage as a means of personal self-definition and shared humanity did not 
originate in the lesbian and gay community.  Rather, the reshaping of marriage’s purpose 
by heterosexual individuals is what permitted marriage equality to be logically and 
seamlessly extended by Obergefell. 
 
Part II suggests that there indeed is something different, something unique that 
marriage offers to its participants.  Sex, procreation, and companionship have been 
defined as the legal essentials of marriage.  In an effort to articulate a transcendent value 
of marriage, I look at immigration and prisoner cases in which these essentials of 
marriage are absent.  Whatever it is that makes us cry at weddings, these cases 
demonstrate that there is something intangible about marriage that, at times, will inspire 
the State to stretch to give sanctuary to those who are seeking a benefit that marriage 
uniquely offers.  In this respect, Goodridge is correct.  There are times that another’s 
marriage reminds us all of our common humanity.   
Part III proposes a tangible state interest in contemporary marriage: a new 
relationship between the citizen and the Liberal state.  In a fascinating exchange between 
the Obergefell’s majority and Justice Robert’s dissent, Justice Roberts criticizes the 
majority for fashioning a privacy right that had been previously unknown.  Instead of a 
right to be let alone, Obergefell confers an affirmative protection to couples who were not 
harmed by any affirmative government intrusion, deprivation, or seizure.  Obergefell’s 
sword becomes a means by which individuals can newly obtain government benefits 
instead of being merely protected from government harm.  Taking this a step further, the 
essay ends with a call to rethink the concept of constitutional privacy and considers the 
contexts by which government intrusions into personal affairs may at times provide more 
protections than a privacy right that leaves its citizens to fend for themselves.   
 
// 
I. FROM PROCREATION TO LIBERTY: THE LEGAL PURPOSE OF MARRIAGE 
 
                                                 
6 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
7 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
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Much credit must be given to LGBT activists who have advocated for marriage 
equality.8  However, Obergefell should not be proof that Americans have fully embraced 
LGBT equality.9  Rather, the extension of marriage to same-sex couples arose from the 
fact that, over the past 40 years, most straight people had come to internalize a redefined 
purpose of marriage that was much more than procreation.    
 
A. Marriage Was The Exclusive Institution In Which Procreative Sex Was Permitted 
(And Supposed) To Occur. 
 In the 2014 Baskin v. Bogan case, Indiana and Wisconsin defended their same-
sex marriage bans on the basis that marriage must respond to unique issues only 
heterosexual individuals face: procreative sex.  In particular, the States must “try to 
channel unintentionally procreative sex into a legal regime in which the biological father 
is required to assume parental responsibility.”10  But Judge Posner, writing for a 
unanimous panel, tore apart the argument with facts, reason, sarcasm, and outright 
mockery.11 
Although comical when said out loud today, procreation’s centrality to 
marriage—as it was understood fifty years ago—was correct as a descriptive legal 
statement.  In practice, procreation has never been confined to marriage.  There have 
been children born out of wedlock ever since there was wedlock.12  Today, in the United 
States, approximately 40 percent of births occur outside of marriage.13  However, up until 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Molly Ball, How Gay Marriage Became A Constitutional Right, THE ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politics-
activism/397052/; Evan Wolfson, Editorial, Op-Ed: Mary Bonauto is the Supreme Court Super Hero We 
Need and Deserve, The Advocate (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.advocate.com/commentary/2015/04/15/op-ed-mary-bonauto-supreme-court-
hero-we-need-and-deserve.  
9 See generally Chris Isidore, How Businesses Can Still Discriminate Against LGBT People, CNN MONEY 
(Jun 26, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/26/news/companies/lgbt-discrimination/. 
10 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 660. 
11 Judge Posner did not just disagree, but outright mocked the attorneys who defended Indiana and 
Wisconsin’s marriage bans.  For instance, in summarizing the state’s arguments, he said, “Heterosexuals 
get drunk and pregnant, producing unwanted children; their reward is to be allowed to marry. Homosexual 
couples do not produce unwanted children; their reward is to be denied the right to marry.  Go figure.”  Id.  
at 662.  
12 See generally Hong, supra note 4, at 12–13 (“[B]y the sixteenth century, adoption in Europe was not 
common, but when it did occur, was made through informal arrangements that were primarily motivated 
out of humanitarian or charitable impulses. The Christian Church opposed these arrangements, however, 
citing concerns that men were abusing adoption as a means to fold their illegitimate children into a 
legitimate family structure.”); Elisabetta Povoledo, In Search for Killer, DNA Sweep Exposes Intimate 
Family Secrets in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2014 (to find the killer of a child, “investigators embarked on 
the country’s largest DNA dragnet, taking genetic samples from nearly 22,000 people. . . . But what some 
praised as a triumph of modern science and 21st century sleuthing, has also set off a debate about the risks 
of privacy violations and the darkened corners of the past they can expose after the DNA testing also 
revealed something unknown even to the suspect’s family: that he was the illegitimate son of a man who 
had died in 1999.”). 
13 The most recent statistics from the CDC are that unmarried women account for 40.6% of all births in the 
United States. See Unmarried Childbearing, FASTSTATS, (last visited Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm. 
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the 1960s, the 50 states marshaled their police powers to confine legal sex to marriage 
and to ensure that any sex that occurred in a marriage was procreative.   
1. Sex Outside of Marriage Criminalized As Fornication, Adultery, and Rape 
Sex outside of marriage was criminalized, punished as the felony and 
misdemeanor crimes of fornication (sex between unmarried adults) and adultery (sex 
outside of marriage where one person was married to another).14  In these prosecutions, a 
person’s marital status was a critical element of the crime.  When relevant, defendants 
routinely would cite their own or their partner’s marital status as a defense to the charged 
crimes.15   
In this era, rape too was a crime, but not because the conduct violated a woman’s 
sexual autonomy or consent.  Rather, rape was a crime because the act violated a 
woman’s chastity (and from its historical origins, the honor of the victim’s husband, 
father, and brothers).16  When rape occurred between adults, a woman had to prove that 
she had resisted—often with her utmost—her attacker’s use of force during intercourse.17  
Absent proof that a woman resisted rape, she too would have been guilty of the crimes of 
fornication or rape.18   
In contemporary rape law, marriage continues to delineate which sex acts are 
legal and which ones are not.  The crime of statutory rape (sex between an adult and a 
minor) persists as a status crime, not requiring mens rea.19  The fact that such an offense 
                                                 
14 See generally Hopgood v. State, 76 Ga. App. 240, 241 (1947) (“Under Code, § 26-5801, ‘there are three 
distinct kinds of indicatable sexual intercourse, viz. adultery, fornication, and adultery and fornication, the 
offense in each case being a joint one. If both parties to the criminal act are married, each is guilty of 
adultery; if both are single, each is guilty of fornication; if one is married and the other single, each is guilty 
of adultery and fornication.’”). 
15 Hopgood, 76 Ga. App. at 242 (granting a motion for a new trial on the basis that the prosecution failed to 
prove the defendant’s marital status, which constituted insufficient evidence to establish the crime of 
fornication). 
16 Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in 
Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 57 (2008) (in discussing the efforts to reform 
international law, Professor Halley observed the reformers’ goal “not [to] legitimate and entrench the ideas 
that the rape of a woman harmed her because of its meaning to the men in her family or culture, or that it 
harmed a wife, daughter, or sister because it impugned a husband’s, father’s, or brother’s honor.”). 
17 See, e.g., People v. Warren, 446 N.E. 2d 591, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (reversing a rape conviction for 
insufficient evidence because the victim did not “in any meaningful way resist the sexual advances of the 
defendant. . . .”) (citations omitted).  
18 This absurdity continues in modern times.  In 2013, a Norwegian tourist visiting Dubai reported she was 
a victim of a rape. The authorities immediately arrested her for unlawfully having sex outside of marriage. 
See Goulding, et al., Dubai Rule Pardons Norwegian Tourist Convicted After She Reported Rape, CNN 
(July 22, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/22/world/meast/uae-norway-rape-controversy/. After 
international outcry, the rape victim was pardoned for the crime of unlawful sex outside of marriage. Id. 
With her pardon, however, her rapist too was released from prison. Id.; see also Anne M. Coughlin, Sex 
and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1998) (“[A]s Kristin Bumiller puts it--the woman's nonconsent was the 
element that divided one heterosexual crime from another, namely, the woman's nonconsent distinguished 
the man's crime (rape) from the couple's crime (fornication or adultery).”). 
19 “A majority of states make statutory rape (typically a person under seventeen years of age) a strict 
liability offense with respect to the child’s age.  This principle results in some prosectuions in which the 
intercourse is undisputedly consenseual and the child is nearly the age of consent, with the defendant 
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is a strict liability crime makes its only potential defense—marriage—an even more 
remarkable exception.20  The crime of rape also remains defined by marriage.  Although 
the marital rape exception has been formally abolished, marriage reduces the seriousness 
of the offense and lengths of punishment.21  Approximately half of the states “prescrib[e] 
lower punishment for marital rape, or . . . permit[] prosecution only when the husband 
has used the most serious forms of force.”22  
Although Judge Posner mocked Indiana and Wisconsin’s attempts to articulate a 
contemporary state interest in limiting marriage to procreative sex, the notion that the law 
has forged a link between marriage and procreation is far from absurd.  Indeed, marriage 
still casts a long shadow in the definition of contemporary sex crimes. 
2. Criminalizing Cohabitation and Specific Types of Marriages  
Based on concerns that procreation must reside within the confines of traditional 
marriage, criminal statutes also used to sanction those who lived together outside of 
traditional—defined as monogamous and white—marriages.  
Illicit cohabitation—the crime of people of opposite sex living together—was 
criminalized.  These statutes gained popularity after the Civil War as a means to harass 
interracial relationships and members of the Church of the Latter Day Saints.23  Despite 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasonably believing her to be of lawful age.”  CRUMP, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND 
LAWYERING STRATEGIES 356 (3d. ed. 2013). 
20 Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 693–94 (9th Cir. 2007). California’s crime of statutory rape is 
not a crime of moral turpitude in part “because some conduct criminalized under § 261.5(d) would be legal 
if the adult and minor were married.” Id. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited Cal. Penal Code 
section 261.5(a) (defining “unlawful sexual intercourse” for purposes of 261.5(d) as involving intercourse 
“with a person who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, if the person is a minor”) and Cal. Fam. Code 
section 302 (permitting a minor to marry with written consent of a parent and a court order). Id. 
21 The marital rape exemption as a concept of immunity has been formally abolished in all 50 states. In 
1975, South Dakota was the first state to abolish this exception and, in 1993, North Carolina was the last.  
See J.C. Barden, Martial Rape: Drive for Tougher Laws Pressed, N.Y. TIMES May 13, 1987, Battered 
Women’s Justice Project, Marital Rape at 4.  Although few states follow the Model Penal Code’s 
recommendation to codify the marital rape exemption, they do follow the MPC’s recommendation to grade 
the seriousness of the offense based on the marital status of the parties rather than the nature of harm 
inflicted.  See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A 
New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465 (2003). 
22 SANFORD KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES CASES AND MATERIALS 407 (9th ed. 
2012).  California for instance has separate statutes for rape of a non-spouse, section 261 and rape of a 
spouse, section 262.  Under section 262, the rape “of a person who is the spouse of the perpetrator” has 
differently-defined conduct that would result in rape.  Moreover, the statute contemplates “probation, fines” 
for punishment whereas section 261 is punished with prison. 
23 See generally Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1193 (D. Utah 2013) (striking down Utah’s 
cohabitation law as impermissibly vague); United States v. Higgerson, 46 F. 750, 751 (C.C.D. Idaho 1891) 
(“The crime of unlawful cohabitation is the living with two or more women as wives; of treating and 
associating with them as such; the giving to the world the appearance that the marital relation exists with 
them.”); RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 70–91 
(Pantheon Books ed. 2003) (discussing various laws and cases criminalizing interrracial relationships from 
the 1950s to 1976).. In 1882, unlawful cohabitation became a crime in the United States with the enactment 
of the Edmunds Act. See Erin P. B. Zasada, Civil Rights-Rights Protected and Discrimination Prohibited: 
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their nefarious origins, by the 1960s the majority of states had enacted them and used 
them against all cohabitating couples.24  Even through the 2000s, these statutes were 
invoked in various property, intestacy, and landlord-tenant disputes as evidence of 
legitimate public policy and morals.25  
Between 1800 and 1967, 40 states criminalized interracial marriages in some form 
or another.26  The state interest in banning these relationships revolved around 
procreation, and specifically preventing the birth of children from these unions.27  In 
1967, Loving v. Virginia invalidated bans on interracial marriages but contemporary 
vestiges over the state regulation policing interracial marriages can be found.28 
3. Contraception and “Unnatural” Sex 
                                                                                                                                                 
Living in Sin in North Dakota? Not Under My Lease North Dakota Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Peterson, 
2001 Nd 81, 625 N.W.2d 551 (2001), 78 N.D. L. REV. 539, 541 (2002). 
24 “When the Model Penal Code [MPC] was published in 1962, most states in the United States 
criminalized nonmarital cohabitation.” Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for 
Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005).   
25 Katherine C. Gordon, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation Agreements: When Strings Will 
Attach and How to Prevent Them-A State Survey, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 245, 253 (1999) (observing that some 
“states refuse to recognize property agreements or rights arising between unmarried cohabitants for two 
reasons: such relationships are against public policy and cohabitation remains a crime in some states.”).  
One of the most famous examples was the North Dakota Supreme Court decision from 2001, holding that 
landlords could lawfully refuse to rent to unmarried tenants. See N. Dakota Fair Hous. Council, Inc. v. 
Peterson, 625 N.W.2d 551, 553 (N.D. 2001). 
26 Every state whose black population exceeded 5% passed anti-miscegenation laws targeting black and 
white couples. See Leti Volpp, American Mestizo: Filipinos and Antimiscegenation Laws in California, 33 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 795, 833–38 (2000). Alaska, Connecticut, DC, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, Vermont and Wisconsin never passed these laws. See id. On the West Coast, states passed 
anti-miscegenation laws targeting the Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and Southeast Asian populations. See id. 
In the first case to strike down these statutes, Justice Traynor noted the “absurdity” in a Court figuring out 
who falls within the categories of race as defined by the legislatures.  See Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 
729 (1948) (“Blumenbach classified man into five races: Caucasian (white), Mongolian (yellow), Ethiopian 
(black), American Indian (red), and Malayan (brown). Even if that hard and fast classification be applied to 
persons all of whose ancestors belonged to one of these racial divisions, the Legislature has made no 
provision for applying the statute to persons of mixed ancestry. The fact is overwhelming that there has 
been a steady increase in the number of people in this country who belong to more than one race, and a 
growing number who have succeeded in identifying themselves with the Caucasian race even though they 
are not exclusively Caucasian.”). 
27 See State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883) (“It is stated as a well authenticated fact that if the issue of 
a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly 
have any progeny, and such a fact sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks 
and whites, laying out of view other sufficient grounds for such enactments.”). 
28 See Mark Joseph Stern, North Carolina May Soon Let Clerks Refuse Marriage Licenses to Gay and 
Interracial Couples, SLATE, June 2, 2015, 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/06/02/north_carolina_law_lets_magistrates_refuse_marriage_lic
enses_to_gay_and.html (discussing state legislation to permit clerks to refuse to issue marriage licenses to 
gay, interracial, and interfaith couples if the union offends the clerk’s religious beliefs). 
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Even within marriage, States policed what type of sex could occur.  Sodomy—
even when consensual—was defined as unnatural sex, which was in essence sexual 
contact that could not lead to procreation.29   
Although it was not illegal for married couples to use contraception, it was illegal 
for doctors—and others—to advise, counsel, and provide information and contraception 
to married couples.30  The purpose of these statutes was to prevent married people from 
engaging in sex that could not lead to procreation. 
Marriage then was never a license to engage in any type of sex.  To the contrary, 
the old legal framework compelled marital sex to be exclusively procreative in nature and 
practice.  
4. Legitimacy Laws and Parentage 
Having children outside of marriage has never been a crime.  But legitimacy laws 
branded those children and imposed lifelong disadvantages to them.  Under the common 
law, nonmarital children had no right to parental support and no right to inherit from or 
through a parent.  They faced legal and societal barriers when they sought public office, 
entry into professional associations, or to transfer their own property at death.  Until the 
late 1960s, some states issued birth certificates in which the term “bastard” was written 
underneath the space for “father” if a child’s parents were not married.31  This family law 
apartheid furthered the criminal laws’ sanctions against sex outside of marriage.     
 
Today, as much as the legitimacy distinctions have been formally abolished, 
differential treatment towards children born outside of wedlock arguably remains.32   
 
For children born inside of marriages, marriage also continues to play an vital role 
in determining the parent-child relationship.  All states have the presumption that the 
parties to a marriage are a child’s parent, albeit each state has varying rules on when and 
                                                 
29 Cohen v. Cohen, 200 Misc. 19, 103 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (introducing husband’s 
sodomy conviction as a means of receiving a divorce based on adultery in divorce proceeding. The court 
denied the petition because sodomy is a crime against nature, which is different from the sexual intercourse 
required in the statute’s act of adultery). 
30 See, e.g., Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 58, 156 A.2d 508 (1959) (upholding attack against law 
preventing use of contraception by married couples because “despite the occasional hardship which might 
result, the greater good would be served by leaving the statutes as they are.”). But see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 
485–86 (overturning such laws because “[t]he present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the 
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in 
forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its 
goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.”). 
31 Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 347 (2011); Nancy Polikoff, Children of No One, LA TIMES (May 20, 2008) (“Under 
common law, a child born outside marriage used to be fillius nullius, the child of no one. In the Middle 
Ages, it was even a lesser crime to kill a person who had been born to an unmarried woman.”). 
32 In 1968, the Supreme Court first articulated that treating children differently based on their parents’ 
marital status constituted invidious discrimination. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (“We 
start from the premise that illegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’”). For a discussion of continuing 
impact of illegitimacy laws on society and the law, see Maldonado, supra note 31, at 349. 
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how this presumption can be rebutted.33  This doctrine allows both parties to a marriage 
to be full parents without the necessity of adoption and even when there is no biological 
tie to a child.34   
In sum, the States’ attempts to link same-sex marriage bans to procreation proved 
futile in the same-sex marriage debate.  However, historically the states exercised their 
police powers promote, permit, and order procreation inside and outside of marriage.  
Indeed, to the extent that residual policing occurs (such as in rape and legitimacy laws), it 
is akin to the shadow of coverture on marriage: a fact that fascinates the politically-
minded but does not function to regulate behavior as effectively as it once did.35 
B. Early Marriage Equality Cases Mirrored The Legal Reality That The Primary 
Purpose of Marriage Was Procreation 
It is from this context that the pre-Obergefell lines of marriage cases must be 
analyzed.   
Baker v. Nelson was the first case in which two gay men challenged a state clerk’s 
decision not to issue them a marriage license.36  In 1971, there was no law in Minnesota 
expressly limiting marriage to members of the opposite sex.  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court nonetheless dismissed any statutory ambiguity on the grounds that it was 
                                                 
33 See generally Ashley Jacoby, The New Kinship: Constructing Donor-Conceived Families, 31 SYRACUSE 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 251, 262 (2015) (“Still, perhaps the strongest factor in determining parenthood is 
based on the historically rooted marital presumption; dating back to the 1700s, the marital presumption 
dictated that a married man and woman were the parents of a child born into the marriage. Today, the 
presumption remains entrenched in state law throughout the nation, and applies to both heterosexual and 
homosexual couples (where homosexual marriage is recognized).”); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, 
Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 220–21(2011) (in assigning parental rights, 
“[p]references for marriage, biology, or parental function are ideological and when the choice among 
policies is squarely presented, the states split along ideological lines. . . .Thus, Utah, Louisiana, and 
Michigan have issued opinions embracing the importance of marriage, and Texas, Iowa, and Missouri have 
emphasized the importance of biology, all in relatively absolute terms.  The states that offer the starkest 
contrast to these seemingly clear-cut resolutions are states such as California, Massachusetts, and New 
York, which prefer more contextualist decisions.”). 
34 See generally David Dodge, At The Cutting Edge of Gay Family Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014 (“The 
case before Judge Torres concerned a married lesbian couple who, after conceiving with donor sperm, 
petitioned for approval of a second-parent adoption for the non-gestational mother. (Why did that sound so 
familiar?) In a surprise decision, since she had approved many such petitions in the past, Judge Torres ruled 
that adoption was neither ‘necessary nor available’ in this case since a ‘presumption of parenthood’ exists 
for all married couples.”). 
35 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (legitimacy) and notes 19–22 and accompanying text (rape). 
Coverture—the legal status whereby a married woman lost the right to vote and own property was formally 
repealed. The “1 Buy, 2 Sell” rule in various states is an example whereby its operation remained etched in 
contemporary law.  See e.g., Mike Jaquish, One to Buy, Two to Sell, REALTY ARTS, June 13, 2011, 
http://blog.mikejaquish.com/2011/06/13/one-to-buy-two-to-sell-60-seconds-in-real-
estate-cary-nc/ (a realtor explaining about North Carolina’s law that both spouses have to consent to sell 
a property even when one spouse exclusively owns the property). 
36 Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 311 (1971), appeal dismissed “for want of a substantial federal 
question” in Baker v. Nelson, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972). 
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“unrealistic” to think the drafters intended marriage to extend to people of the same sex.37  
The plaintiffs raised a second argument, raising a federal constitutional question, on 
which the Minnesota Supreme Court was equally dismissive.  In explaining how the right 
to marry was limited to heterosexual individuals, the state court observed—in the most 
cursory manner—that “[t]he institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, 
uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the 
book of Genesis.”38 
I believe it is a mistake to write off Baker v. Nelson’s citation to procreation as 
outdated anti-gay discrimination.39  To the contrary, what is notable is that procreation 
was presented as such an obvious, central, and defining aspect of marriage that no further 
explanation (or citation outside of The Book of Genesis) was needed.40     
Baker v. Nelson’s unassailable assumption that marriage could only exist with the 
promise of procreation was not confined to heterosexuality.  To the contrary, Loving v. 
Virginia, which was decided four years earlier, reinforces the purpose of marriage to be 
procreation.41  In explaining the value of marriage, the Supreme Court noted that 
marriage was “fundamental to our very existence and survival.”42  This phrase was not 
intended to be hyperbole.  Rather, the Supreme Court supports “our very existence,” with 
a citation to Skinner v. Oklahoma, the case ending the State’s ability to sterilize its 
citizens.43  Procreation becomes an essential element of marriage, as marriage is the 
exclusive means by which the species propagates itself.  The unassailable axiom is that 
marriage exists for producing children, and without marriage, no more children would be 
born.  
Viewed from our contemporary eyes, this centrality of procreation to marriage 
seems confusing and anachronistic.  But in 1967 (the date of Loving) and 1971 (the date 
of Baker), society was continuing to police, and still criminalize, sex outside of marriage.  
                                                 
37 Baker, 291 Minn. at 311. 
38 Id. at 312. 
39 For years, legal commentators criticized the Supreme Court’s decisions, such as Baker, which mirrored 
the larger society’s animus against and “pity” towards gay men and lesbians. See Sylvia A. Law, 
Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 192–93 (“The legal penalties 
imposed upon homosexual people are deep and cruel, and they enforce a pervasive social censure. . . . Most 
Americans disapprove of people who engage in homosexual conduct.”). Since Windsor, federal and state 
judges have been articulating pointed criticisms of these prior decisions as anachronistic and 
discriminatory. See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 660 (Posner, J.) (“Baker was decided in 1972—42 years ago 
and the dark ages so far as litigation over discrimination against homosexuals is concerned.”).   
40 The irony, of course, is that Genesis is not the place to find models of happy monogamous heterosexual 
pairings. Rather, God found favor with the fathers of the Judeo-Christian religion—Abraham, David, 
Jacob—and those religious figures were in adulterous, bigamous, and polygamous relationships.  
41 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
42 Id. 
43 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942) (holding that under equal protection, the State cannot 
sterilize those convicted of larceny when those conviction of embezzlement are subjected to the same 
punishment. “We have not the slightest basis for inferring that that line has any significance in eugenics nor 
that the inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat legal distinctions which the law has marked 
between those two offenses.”). 
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In this context, procreation as a—if not the—defining state interest in marriage was quite 
rational and reasoned. 
C. From Goodridge to Windsor: Rethinking The Primary Purpose of Marriage  
In the history of social change, it is easy for legal scholars to be reductive in our 
thinking, to trace shifts from one Supreme Court decision to another.  What is lost in this 
method is that progress usually is not made in full steady strides.  To the contrary, state 
courts show the fits and starts that occur as society grapples with the collateral issues that 
legal equality ushers in.44   
Obergefell will most certainly be published in casebooks documenting marriage 
equality for lesbian and gay individuals.45  However, the Obergefell decision was not the 
first decision to recognize the social zeitgeist regarding how marriage changed.  Rather, it 
was the 2003 decision, Goodridge v. Massachusetts, a decision from a decade earlier, that 
did so.   
In 2003, Goodridge made history as the first state court that fully and forcefully 
extended marriage to same-sex couples.46  Unique to Goodridge, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court did not ask the question of whether gay and lesbian couples could 
                                                 
44 By way of example, Loving v. Virginia is usually called up as the case that ended the country’s ban on 
anti-miscegenation laws. But 19 years earlier—in 1948—the California Supreme Court was the first to 
strike down an anti-miscegenation law—six years before the Supreme Court ended segregation as a 
violation of equal protection in Brown v. Board of Education. See Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 729. For an excellent 
discussion on how Perez had a more robust discussion of the harms of anti-miscegenation laws than what is 
found in Loving, see R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the 
Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 844–45 (2008). 
45 See HARRIS & CARBONE, FAMILY LAW (2015) (updating Family Law book with Obergefell citation in 
August 2015). 
46 In 1993, Hawaii became the first state to have its judiciary suggest that the denial of marriage to same-
sex couples might be an equal protection problem.  Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 559, 852 P.2d 44, 58 
(1993) (holding that the plaintiffs may have articulated an equal protection right to marriage and remanding 
the case for an evidentiary hearing on that question). In 1998, Hawaii’s voters, however, undid the judicial 
ruling by amending their constitution to bar such unions. As an unintended lasting impact, the possibility of 
same-sex marriage was the impetus for the enactment of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. See Richard 
Socarides, Why Bill Clinton Signed the Defense Of Marriage Act, NEW YORKER (Mar. 8, 2013) (“As 
Republicans prepared for the 1996 Presidential election, they came up with what they thought was an 
extremely clever strategy. A gay-rights lawsuit in Hawaii was gaining press coverage as an initial series of 
preliminary court rulings suggested that gay marriage might be legally conceivable there. Clinton was on 
the record opposing marriage equality. But Republicans in Congress believed that he would still veto 
legislation banning federal recognition of otherwise valid same-sex marriages, giving them a campaign 
issue: the defense of marriage.”). In 1999, Vermont became the first state to expressly declare that the 
denial of marriage to same-sex couples violated Vermont’s “Common Benefits Clause,” a state provision 
that operated as a more robust form of the federal equal protection clause. Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 202 
(1999). However, this court decision too was diluted by the legislature that refused to extend marriage to 
same-sex couples. See Liz Halloran, How Vermont’s “Civil” War Fueled the Gay Marriage Movement, 
NPR (Mar. 23, 2013) (“It seemed radical at the time, and tore the state apart so wretchedly and publicly 
that historians were hard-pressed to come up with a parallel.”  The irony is that in short order, civil unions, 
“Vermont's pioneering law is viewed by many as an artifact.”). 
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be excluded from marriage.47  In so doing, the decision avoided the pitfalls of prior 
decisions that noted the historical absence of these relationships or were mired in the 
contemporary moral opprobrium against gay people.48  
 
Instead, Goodridge’s starting point instead was “[s]imply put, the government 
creates civil marriage.”49  Goodridge’s deft turn reframed the question from a plaintiff 
same sex couple asking for an exception to the longstanding history of civilization, to 
rather, examining what was the purpose of marriage for all of us.  In answering this 
question, Goodridge made three notable contributions to the framing of the marriage 
debate.  
First, Goodridge enumerated the hundreds of private and social advantages that 
the State conferred on those who married.50  Marriage was taken outside of the moral and 
religious debates of the day.51  Goodridge squarely defended marriage as a public 
institution that was properly defined by state government.    
Second, Goodridge redefined the personal commitment to marriage to be “the 
decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-
definition.”52  Instead of the linchpin that perpetuates the human race, the act of falling in 
love with another was seemingly a much more pedestrian:  a choice that some people 
made, and others did not.  
                                                 
47 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 320 (recognizing that marriage traditionally involved heterosexual couples and 
dismissed that significance because “that history cannot and does not foreclose the constitutional 
question.”). 
48 Andersen v. King Cnty., 158 Wash.2d 1, 44, 138 P.3d 963, 986 (2006) (upholding state DOMA statute 
because “As we explained earlier in this opinion, there is no history of marriage in this state that includes 
same-sex marriage. Thus, the citizens of Washington have not held a privacy interest in marriage that 
includes a right to marry a person of the same sex.”); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 362, 855 N.E.2d 
1, 9 (2006) (“The right to marry someone of the same sex, however, is not “deeply rooted”; it has not even 
been asserted until relatively recent times.”); Baehr, 74 Haw. at 553, as clarified on reconsideration 
(“Whether the Court viewed marriage and procreation as a single indivisible right, the least that can be said 
is that it was obviously contemplating unions between men and women when it ruled that the right to marry 
was fundamental. This is hardly surprising inasmuch as none of the United States sanctioned any other 
marriage configuration at the time.”). 
49 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 321. 
50 Id. at 322 (“Tangible as well as intangible benefits flow from marriage. The marriage license grants 
valuable property rights to those who meet the entry requirements, and who agree to what might otherwise 
be a burdensome degree of government regulation of their activities.” The Court then listed the specific 
statutes and benefits that benefit those who are married.). 
51 In 2003, no mainstream religious organizations supported same-sex marriage. Robert P. Jones, Religious 
Americans Support Gay Marriage, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/religious-americans-support-gay-marriage/391646/. 
“The highest levels of support among major religious groups came from white mainline Protestants, of 
whom 36 percent favored same-sex marriage, and Catholics, with 35 percent support. Nearly two-thirds of 
the religiously unaffiliated, by contrast, supported same-sex marriage.” Id. But, by 2015, “the debate has 
shifted from one between religious and non-religious Americans to one that primarily pits older, 
conservative Christians against moderate, progressive, or younger Christians, Jews, and the religiously 
unaffiliated.” Id.  
52 Goodridge, 440 Mass. at 322. 
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Third, Goodridge reimagined how the institution of marriage contributed to 
society.  “Because it fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that 
express our common humanity. . .” 53  Of note, a person’s most intimate act of falling in 
love continued to aggregate into a larger public purpose.  The personal decision to marry 
became a means to stake out an identity.  The public impact of such a decision permitted 
one’s identity to be a shared currency that was recognized and accepted by many.  
The state interest in marriage was no longer was an exclusively heterosexual 
function of procreation or perpetuating the species.  Instead, the right to marry became 
fundamental because it permitted someone to partake in the full range of human 
experience.  Those who choose to marry share a means of publicly expressing their 
inclusion in a shared attribute of dignity and membership in the larger community.54  For 
gay men and lesbians, they were no longer excluded from the biological function of 
procreation.  To the contrary, a gay man’s or lesbian’s act of falling in love with another 
became a recognized trait, extending an invitation to the previously-exiled into an invited, 
included community.55 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 For criticisms of the elevation of marriage to serve this purpose, see Michael Cobb, The Supreme Court’s 
Lonely Hearts Club, NY TIMES, June 30, 2015 (“Certainly Justice Kennedy’s sense of marital ‘dignity’ is 
over the top. But it’s not just sentimental rhetoric: It’s a kind of legal ‘term of heart’ that can keep you up at 
night. The words and the value they communicate are impossible to avoid, and often difficult to resist. It’s 
as if the words of Justice Kennedy and my grandmother, who, on her deathbed, begged me to get married, 
have melded together in my head, declaring my life lacking — emotions meet law and then throw me into a 
state of emotional insecurity.”). 
55 In 2003, Goodridge’s redefinition of the marriage debate was not at all embraced. To the contrary, from 
2004 to 2012, 41 states raced to amend—and successfully amended—state laws and constitutions to 
prevent their courts from following Massachusetts. Following Hawaii’s 1996 decision, states first started 
amending their laws to exclude same-sex couples from marriage. In 2004, another wave of voter initiatives 
passed constitutional amendments. See James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004 (“Proposed state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage 
increased the turnout of socially conservative voters in many of the 11 states where the measures appeared 
on the ballot on Tuesday”); Tim Grieve, Bush’s War Over Gay Marriage, SALON, Feb. 26, 2004 (“While 
Americans are broadly supportive of gay rights, gay marriage is widely unpopular, particularly with blue-
collar whites and African-Americans whose support the Democrats will need in November.”); see also 
interactive data found at http://www.pewforum.org/2015/06/26/same-sex-marriage-state-by-
state/. In January 2012, the only 6 states that recognized same-sex marriage were Massachusetts, Iowa, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, New York, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia. See Erik Eckholm, One 
Man Guides the Fight Against Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012. In May of that year, President 
Obama made history by being the first sitting president to say, in an interview with ABC news, “ I've just 
concluded that for me, personally, it is important for me to go ahead and affirm that I think same-sex 
couples should be able to get married.  Phil Gast, Obama Announces He Supports Same-Sex Marriage,  
CNN, May 9, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/09/politics/obama-same-sex-marriage/. 
President Obama did not announce any policy, propose legislation, or issue any executive orders. Id. 
Rather, his simple statement is now viewed as an Emperor Has No Clothes Moment, a time when suddenly 
people admitted that they too either supported same-sex marriage, or at the least, stopped efforts to oppose 
it. From that moment, no other state enacted legislation to stop same-sex marriage. In June 2013, 9 states 
had recognized same-sex marriage. After United States v. Windsor, voters and legislatures repealed bans, 
voters and legislatures enacted affirmative legislature, and courts struck down bans so that in June 2015, 37 
states recognized marriage equality, leaving only 13 states subject to the Supreme Court Obergefell 
decision. See ___U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
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In today’s world, outside of the legal arena, procreation no longer resonates as the 
primary purpose of marriage.  Sex outside of marriage has been decriminalized.56  Young 
people no longer save themselves for marriages.57  (Indeed for those that do, they are the 
curiosity of reality shows.)58   
 
Gay people thus were not granted marriage rights neither because of a shift in 
gender roles in heterosexual marriages nor as an embrace of a larger LGBT equality 
movement.  Rather, straight people no longer required procreation to occur in marriages; 
marriages no longer required procreation to bring value to a marital relationship.59  It is 
precisely this shift in the societal understanding marriage that no longer required 
procreation to be its defining element that allowed marriage to be logically—and 
legally—extended to same-sex couples in a seamless manner.  
 
II. SEARCHING FOR A TRANSCENDENT STATE INTEREST IN MARRIAGE 
 
A. What If In Fact There Is Something Special About Marriage? 
 
As mentioned above, the forty-year debate over the merits of same-sex marriage 
was marked with an ideological divide.  Conservative scholars lauded the institution of 
marriage and many liberal scholars were skeptical of the emphasis on and importance of 
the institution.60   
 
Now divorced from the nefarious ends of divesting rights from lesbian and gay 
citizens, new conversations have begun regarding what may be the value in marriage.  
Specifically, there are two notable ways by which marriage is different from other 
relationships.   
 
First, there is a post-modern, formalist function to marriage.  When the state of 
California gave every single of the estimated 1,400 legal rights and benefits to same-sex 
couples that it gave to opposite-sex couples, the omission of one single word—the title of 
                                                 
56 See supra notes 14–37 and accompanying text. 
57 John Blake, Why Young Christians Aren’t Waiting Anymore, CNN (Sept. 27, 2011) (“80 percent of 
unmarried evangelical young adults (18 to 29) said that they have had sex—slightly less than 88 percent of 
unmarried adults, according to the teen pregnancy prevention organization”).  
58 See 19 Kids and Counting, a recently cancelled reality show focused on a conservative Christian family 
that did not use birth control and did not permit their children to engage in sexual activity before marriage. 
59 Nicholas DiDomizio, 11 Brutally Honest Reasons Why Millennials Don’t Want Kids, 
CONNECTIONS.MIC, July 30, 2015 (“According to data from the Urban Institute, birth rates among 20-
something women declined 15% between 2007 and 2012. Additional research from the Pew Research 
Center reflects a longer-term trend of women eschewing parenthood as the number of U.S. women who 
choose to forego motherhood altogether has doubled since 1970. This trend is fascinating, in part because 
there's long been a taboo associated with people (particularly, women) choosing to opt out of 
parenthood.”). In Gallup polls, those who found it “morally acceptable” for unmarried men and women to 
have sex increased from 53% in 2001 to 68% in 2015.  Those who found it “morally acceptable” to give 
birth outside of marriage also rose from 42% in 2001 to 61% in 2015. Gallup Poll, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx. 
60 See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. But see MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS (Marsha Garrison 
& Elizabeth Scott eds., Cambridge 2012) (collection of essays discussing aspects of policy that promotes 
marriage and non-marital families). 
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marriage—mattered.  The Ninth Circuit observed that a constitutional right may even 
attach to “the extraordinary significance of the official designation of ‘marriage.’”61  
Writing for the majority, Judge Reinhardt observed that “[a] rose by any other name may 
smell as sweet, but to the couple desiring to enter into a committed lifelong relationship, 
a marriage by the name of ‘registered domestic partnership’ does not.”62  There is 
growing scholarship that contends that the act of marriage itself, the formalization of a 
private relationship into something larger does indeed create something larger that cannot 
be replicated in other relationships.63  
 
Second, others have started to excavate and name the intangible benefits that may 
arise from marriage.64  That said, an inquiry into the intangible benefits will be a tangled 
one at best.  We have a century-worth of cases recognizing various values that marriage 
has had in the lives of its citizens.  Traditionally, those benefits have been conferred to 
only one party, most specifically husbands rather than wives.65  Nonetheless there have 
been notable moments when courts have started to recognize some transcendent values in 
marriage that do provide benefits that are arguably desirable in contemporary times.   
 
To contribute to what may be an intangible benefit uniquely arising from 
marriage, in the next section, I wish to look at three cases where the traditional essentials 
of marriage—sex, procreation, and companionship—are not just absent, but impossible.   
 
B. Seeking A Transcendent, Intangible Benefit in Marriage 
In 2002, in Gerber v. Hickman, a prisoner brought a section 1983 claim, asking 
the warden to give him permission to send through the mail a vial of sperm to his wife so 
that his she may attempt procreation with medical assistance.66  The en banc court upheld 
the warden’s denial, but a vociferous dissent by Judge Alex Kozinski took to task the 
                                                 
61 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012) vacated and remanded sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 186 L. Ed.2d 768 (2013). 
62 Id.  
63 See generally Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2009–
10 (2014) (discussing the transformative effects of formalizing relationships such as marriage). 
64 See MARTHA M. ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES: HOW FORMAL AND INFORMAL CONTRACTS SHAPE ALL 
KINDS OF FAMILIES (Beacon Press 2015) (in this beautiful memoir, Professor Ertman makes a compelling 
case as to how marriage has been different for her in defining her relationship to her wife and their 
relationship with their child). For instance, kindness appears to be a quality that those in marriage may be 
likely to acquire. Social scientists are realizing that kindness operates like a muscle, which if exercised, can 
be learned and developed. See Emily Esfahani Smith, Masters of Love, THE ATLANTIC, June 12, 2014, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/06/happily-ever-after/372573. This is not 
say that unmarried people are not kind and cannot acquire kindness, but social research is suggesting that 
for those in the crucible of marriage, in order to maintain intimacy with another, they must learn and 
exercise the qualities of kindness and generosity if they wish to have a happy marriage. If it is shown that 
those qualities are developed and are imported into other aspects of a person’s life, perhaps it was too early 
to dismiss the work of conservative authors who defended traditional marriage’s functional value. 
65 See generally Borelli v. Brusseau, 12 Cal. App. 4th 647, 651 (1993) (striking down contract awarding 
property to wife who agreed to take care of her dying husband) (“It is fundamental that a marriage contract 
differs from other contractual relations in that there exists a definite and vital public interest in reference to 
the marriage relation. The paramount interests of the community at large is a matter of primary concern.”). 
66 Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
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holding that “the right to procreate is inconsistent with incarceration.”67  In engaging in 
the legal issues in the case, Judge Kozinski cited to state regulations that do permit 
prisoners to potentially procreate when conjugal relationships are granted.  His fiery 
dissent, however, is more powerful as a means to question what can a marriage provide to 
parties when they cannot procreate and—with the permanent separation of a term of life 
imprisonment—cannot share lives in the way that those living together do?  
In 1964, in Matter of Peterson, a 56-year-old citizen met a 49-year-old woman 
who was a citizen of Iran.68  The husband was a widower, and the wife had an adult 
daughter from her first marriage.  They first met when the woman (later wife) answered 
an ad placed by the man (later husband) looking for a housekeeper with marriage as a 
potential result.  When the citizen applied for his wife’s green card, the immigration 
agency initially deemed the application fraudulent, citing as proof the couple’s initial 
meeting, and their admissions that they sleep in separate bedrooms and have not, and will 
not, engage in sexual intercourse.  On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—
an agency known for restrictive, if not draconian, interpretations of immigration law—
reversed.  The BIA did not quite explain how and why, but noted with sympathy that the 
husband was a widower in genuine need of a housekeeper.  In a conclusory manner, the 
BIA found that “[t]he reasons for the marriage appear to be far sounder than exist for 
most marriages.”69 
The most obvious shared insight from the Gerber and Peterson cases is that 
companionship is an aspect to marriage that the State recognizes and values.  The State’s 
protection of marriage benefits its own citizens and society at large (cynically, it serves as 
private welfare, more optimistically, the means by which the State may have a role in 
giving the pursuit of happiness to its citizenry). 
But the third case, Freeman v. Gonzales, prevents companionship from being the 
only available answer to the question as to why there is a State interest in contemporary 
marriage.70  Under our immigration laws, U.S. citizens are allowed to bring their spouses 
to the country and give them lawful permanent residence.71  This is more than settled 
practice and policy; it is the defining hallmark of our immigration system.72   
In 1997, Congress wrote a confusing provision regulating what happens when a 
citizen spouse dies during the petition process.  A circuit split arose, and Freeman was 
one of the courts that defended the statutory interpretation that even when a citizen dies, 
his widow can enter and live in the US.  “Under the express terms of the statute, Mrs. 
Freeman qualified as the spouse of a U.S. citizen when she and her husband petitioned 
                                                 
67 In employing humor in a way that only Judge Kozinski can, he criticizes the penological interests in the 
five steps that would be involved in the prisoner’s request. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 629 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
68 Matter of Peterson, 12 I. & N. Dec. 663, 664 (BIA 1968). 
69 Id. 
70 Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006). 
71 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006). 
72 Two-thirds of lawful immigration occurs through family relationships with citizens or other lawful 
permanent residents.  INA § 203, Jacquellena Carrero, The Immigration Line: Who’s on It and For How 
Long, NBCLatino, Apr. 11, 2013. 
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for adjustment of status, and absent a clear statutory provision voiding her spousal status 
upon her husband's untimely death, she remains a surviving spouse.”73  In 2009, President 
Obama signed a law, firmly establishing that the Freeman rule will be uniformly applied.  
As a result, when a citizen dies, his or her widow—a foreigner who is a citizen from 
another country—can now enter and live in the US, a coveted privilege conferred only to 
the spouses, children, and parents of citizens.  This change in immigration law is 
profound by recognizing that the benefits of marriage do not extinguish even in death. 
These three cases survey instances when sex, procreation, companionship—and 
even a spouse—are not just missing, but completely impossible in the marital 
relationship.  These cases are significant, because usually, when these essentials are 
absent, the State will not recognize a formal relationship.  Most states expressly define 
consummation as an essential statutory element of the marriage.74  For most everyone but 
the Petersons, the federal government will require consummation as proof that a marriage 
is not fraudulent when conferring immigration benefits.75  The vast majority of states 
require both people to be present and alive for a marriage to be recognized.76 
 Peterson, Gerber, Freeman defied these general rules.  It is interesting that the 
courts defended the marital relationship—and their exceptions to the general rule—
without being able to name what it is precisely about the relationships that compel such 
sympathy.  Whether it be a platonic companionship, a security, an ideal, or even 
posthumous identity and caretaking function, marriage is providing important benefits we 
have yet to easily articulate.  Nonetheless, as much as these cases do not conclusively 
name what it is, they signal a trailhead, a path that is worthy to undertake to identify and 
articulate what that intangible aspect of marriage is.  Regardless, these cases suggest 
something intangible, something of value exists in marriage.  In this respect, Goodridge 
appears correct.  Perhaps whatever it is that makes us cry at weddings, these three 
                                                 
73 Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039-40. 
74 See generally Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-1 (West) (“To constitute a valid marriage in this state there must be: 
(1) Parties able to contract; (2) An actual contract; and (3) Consummation according to law”). This area is a 
complicated one and the litigation testing the statutes usually arises in common law marriage claims after 
an (alleged) divorce or death in which one party was seeking benefits from another, an estate, or the State.  
See e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, 188 Ga. App. 821 (1988) (involving inheritance based on common law 
marriage through action in probate court). 
75 Congress and the BIA have statutes and case law stating that consummation is not required to prove the 
existence of a valid marriage. See Matter of M, 7 I & N. Dec 601 (BIA 1957).  Nonetheless, in immigration 
proceedings, citizens and non-citizens are often required to answer questions about their sex lives.  See Adi 
v. United States, 498 F.Appx. 478, 482 (6th Cir. 2012). Individual immigration officers will find a marriage 
invalid in the absence of convincing evidence as to why there is consummation. See Nina Bernstein, Do 
You Take This Immigrant? N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010 (in explaining the marriage fraud interview, the 
reporter observed, “And were they ready to answer far more intimate queries from a government official 
hunting for signs their marriage was fake? ‘Embarrassing questions,’ explained the Manhattanite, Lindsay 
Garvy-Yeguf, 28, the butterfly tattoo on her foot growing jittery, as her husband, Gunes Yeguf, 31, turned 
paler in his dark suit. ‘They might ask you about your sex life.’”). 
76 See generally Andrea B. Carroll, Reviving Proxy Marriage, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 457 (2011) (“[A] 
proxy marriage is not a valid marriage at all in most states. Only five American states have recognized 
otherwise, and nearly all in an exceptionally narrow context involving military personnel. So serious is the 
contempt for proxy marriage that the doctrine has been rejected throughout most of this country for almost 
seventy years.”). 
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marriages are examples whereby another’s marriage reminds us all of our common 
humanity.   
III. The Counterintuitive Liberal State Interest In Contemporary Marriage 
 
As much as articulating an intangible state interest in marriage is a difficult—yet 
important—journey, contemporary marriage does offer an important opportunity for 
citizens to redefine their relationship to the Liberal state.  
 
Parens patraie—the doctrine that the State has a role to protect those who cannot 
otherwise fend for themselves—is a means by which the modern State exercises its 
authority to protect the vulnerable, most often children and the mentally incompetent.77 
When the State intervenes for the purpose of protecting the vulnerable, the vast majority 
of Americans do see State involvement as a normative good.78  
 
Asking the State to lend additional support married couples, those with the most 
resources and protections, is a counterintuitive, if not morally questionable project.79  In 
                                                 
77 Parens patrie empowers the state to confer “protection for those unable to care for themselves.” BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990); see also Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English Child Custody Law, 
1600-1839: The Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1344, 1346–47 
(1999) (explaining that parens patriae is “the ancient English doctrine that the King, as the father of the 
nation, has the power to act in protection of the nation's weak and powerless, namely infants, idiots, and 
lunatics. Today, in both the United States and England, parens patriae is used in a variety of contexts, from 
protection of the mentally ill to the law of juvenile courts, in order to justify the state's power to 
intervene.”). 
78 See generally Michael Levenson, Baker Says State Will Review DCF Handling of Auburn Child, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 17, 2015 (in story about the death of a two-year old child in foster care, the newspaper talks 
about how the Republican governor ran on a platform to “revamp the troubled child welfare system” and a 
class action suit that attempted to increase the state agency’s intervention on behalf of children who are 
facing neglect and abuse).   
79 Contemporary marriage does not appear to be an institution in need of extra support. Although 
sometimes difficult to always quantify, those in happy marriages are often the beneficiaries of financial 
security, health, and happiness. “Today married people in Western Europe and North America are generally 
happier, healthier, and better protected against economic setbacks and psychological depression than 
people in any other living arrangement.” Stephanie Coontz, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY 309 (Viking 2005). 
“But using averages to give personal advice to individuals or to construct social policy for all is not wise. . . 
. [I]ndividuals in unhappy marriages are more psychologically distressed than people who stay single, and 
many of marriage’s health benefits fade if the marriage is troubled.” Id. at 310. Although the marriage rates 
have declined for the general population, those with college degrees are marrying—and staying married—
at rates not seen since the 1950s. Indeed, in the first ten years of marriage, the divorce rate for college 
graduates is 11%. See generally Pamela Paul, How Divorce Lost Its Groove, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011 
(“As noted by the National Marriage Project study, ‘Highly educated Americans have moved in a more 
marriage-minded direction, despite the fact that historically, they have been more socially liberal.’. . . 
According to a 2010 study by the National Marriage Project at the University of Virginia, only 11 percent 
of college-educated Americans divorce within the first 10 years today, compared with almost 37 percent for 
the rest of the population. . . .). Moreover, despite the lack of judgment on whether others should or should 
not marry, young Americans continue to hold individual aspirations for their own marriage. For those 
without college educations, 81% wish to marry; for those without college educations, the numbers climb to 
92%. In a Gallup poll from June 20 to 24, 2013, the numbers broke down to 22% currently married (not 
college graduate) and 45% (college graduate) and 59% never married and want to get married (not college 
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today’s society, it is the unmarried people, especially those with children, who face the 
vulnerabilities that arise from a lack of legal protections and economic insecurity.  A 
number of scholars have noted disadvantages, and at times harms, that the institution of 
marriage can perpetuate.  Martha Fineman and Clare Huntington have been among the 
most persuasive voices, calling for reforms to support for non-marital family units.80  
 
Although I am in full agreement with the need for responding to those outside of 
marriage, I seek to make a case for the State intervention and support of those who do opt 
for marriage.   
 
A. Privacy As The Fundamental Right To Be Let Alone 
 
As a preliminary matter, I wish to first revisit the assumption that it is the right to 
be let alone that provides essential protections to our selves and democracy.  It is an 
understatement to contend that privacy is a valued commodity.  As Justice Brandeis 
articulated 100 years ago, the Founders “undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the government, the right 
to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.”81   
From a citizen’s right to control his home and destiny, American life has been 
imbued with a sense that an individual’s right to privacy is a precondition to achieving 
essential freedoms and liberties.82  The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Amendments reinforce the idea that the right to be let alone—and left alone—from the 
State remains a vital, contemporary protection we receive from our democratic 
institutions.  For instance, in the pressing question of whether the National Security 
Agency may watch and record the electronic communications of U.S. citizens, in 2015, 
                                                                                                                                                 
graduate) and 47% (college graduate). Gallup Poll, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163802/marriage-importance-dropped.aspx.  
80See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIP 
(Oxford 2014) (arguing how the legal regulation of families stands at odds with the needs of families); see 
also MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (Routledge 1995) (arguing that the best interests of children and women 
are served outside of marriage and reform is needed to support dependency and caretaking).  
81Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (in dissenting from a 
decision upholding the government’s collection of evidence by wiretapping, Justice Brandeis wrote a 
forceful opinion arguing that for a citizen’s right be let alone is a fundamental value in our democracy);  
 see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890) 
(articulating the “right to be left alone” in tort contexts). 
82 See ALEXANMDER DE TOQUEVILLE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1825).  Most non-lawyers speak of having 
affirmative rights to education, safety, health, and guns. The notion that the Constitution confers not only 
individual rights (a new concept, born of the 1950s), but also affirmative rights (as opposed to negative 
rights) is presumed correct. But reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of how our Constitution limits 
government intrusion rather than guaranteeing affirmative rights and privileges that other countries’ 
constitutions do. 
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the first court to curtail that practice did so by expressly invoking the need to stop “the 
intrusion of government into private matters.”83  
In family law, privacy also has been embraced as an expansive, dynamic doctrine, 
preventing the State from intruding upon familial decisions relating to procreation, 
abortion, child rearing, education, and family formation.84    
Family scholars have robustly critiqued the conditional nature of these 
protections.  Functional—and presumed functioning—families are let alone by the state.  
A family that possesses either a Man or Money (preferably both) may raise its children 
with as much confusion and chaos as it pleases as privacy shields inquiries and intrusion 
by the State.  By contrast, what Martha Fineman has called “public families”—families 
that are marked as inadequate or inferior—are subject to State “regulation, supervision, 
and control.”85  The disruption of divorce, poverty, and abuse invites—and compels—the 
State to intervene. 86    
Underlying these criticisms is the unspoken assumption has been that a family’s 
right to be let alone is ultimately a desired state to which all families normatively should 
belong.  
But what if it is not the State intervention that is in fact the problem?  What if it is 
rather the underlying biases that sort out some families for regulation—rather than a 
family’s public status—that is the root of the matter?  Stated another way, what if the 
problem of regulating, policing, and punishing public families arises from the biases 
seeking conformity to a normative ideals but not the vehicle of State intervention, 
standing by itself? 
B. Obergefell’s Sword: Rethinking State Harm As Arising From No State 
Intervention  
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
NSA’s collection of telephone metadata exceeded statutory authority). 
84 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (family formation); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 484 (1977) 
(extending familial protects protections afforded to caretakers to grandparents who raise children); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (procreation); Griswold, 
381 U.S. (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child-rearing); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (family formation). 
85 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, supra note 83 (defining “public families” as those in which the mother-
father-child triad is missing, specifically, when a man is absent from a family, the family is subject to 
surveillance, regulation, and punishment). 
86 See generally Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 168 (4th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a civil right challenge to a 
state’s records of suspect child abusers on the basis that the plaintiff parents “have not demonstrated a 
violation of any federal constitutional or statutory right of familial privacy. The confines of that right were 
not so clearly established that, even if Defendants' acts did impinge the Hodge family's zone of privacy, 
they could objectively or reasonably have known that their conduct violated the Due Process Clause.”); 
Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 113, 118–19 (2011) 
(“[I]t is poor women’s and families’ poverty that subjects them to the suspension of the rights to privacy. . . 
.[T]he reliance on the welfare state (for medical services or otherwise) makes ‘public’ even the family that 
has managed to fulfill heteronormative ideals.”). 
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Much has been written about the trifecta of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, but the 
right to privacy has taken on new qualities in the marriage equality movement. 
Beginning in Lawrence v. Texas, it was the right to be let alone that paved the 
way for Obergefell’s recognition of same-sex marriage.  Lawrence begins with the 
precise pronouncement that “Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.  In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home.”87  It is this predicate formulation of privacy that leads to the 
abolishment of state laws criminalizing what is otherwise consensual, intimacy between 
adults.   
Twelve years later, when establishing that marriage is a fundamental right that 
must be conferred to same-sex couples, Obergefell cited to Lawrence a dozen times to 
support its reasoning and result.88   
But of import, Obergefell articulated a new intrusion of the State, which is not 
regulation or punishment of private choices.  Rather, the harm inflicted on those from 
whom marriage is withheld is “the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that 
soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”89  Privacy no 
longer is a carved out realm, a space apart from the State’s views in which individuals 
may order their lives in peace.  Rather, Justice Kennedy articulates a privacy right that 
demands that the State remove itself from public expressions that inflicts humiliation and 
stigmatization onto others.  In so doing, the State then must arbitrate values and 
affirmatively protect those who are vulnerable to non-legal and intangible injuries.  The 
State suddenly becomes a guarantor of affirmative benefits. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Roberts strongly objects to Obergefell’s new 
definition of privacy.  In objecting to the conclusion that recognition of same-sex 
marriage is required by the constitution, he observes that “[n]either Lawrence nor any 
other precedent in the privacy line of cases supports the right that petitioners assert 
here.”90  Justice Roberts notes that [u]nlike criminal laws banning contraceptives and 
sodomy, the marriage laws at issue here involve no government intrusion.  They create 
no crime and impose no punishment.  Same-sex couples remain free to live together, to 
engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families as they see fit.  No one is 
‘condemned to live in loneliness’ by the laws challenged in these cases—no one.”91 
Justice Roberts affirms that “the laws [limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples] in no 
way interfere with the ‘right to be let alone.’”92  To again emphasize the perceived break 
that Obergefell makes from prior precedent, “petitioners do not seek privacy.  Quite the 
opposite, they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with corresponding 
government benefits.  Our cases have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the 
                                                 
87 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
88 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. 
90 Id.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
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shield provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements 
from the State.”93  
Obergefell is important because for the first time, the privacy doctrine is no longer 
a means to let people alone.  The harm imposed on same-sex couples by the State is not 
the harm envisioned by Justice Brandeis.  It was not an unwanted intervention in the 
sacred realm that caused injury, but rather, the State’s lack of intervention that inflicted 
the harm on the couple.  Under the guise of privacy, State intervention then becomes a 
powerful tool to obtain needed benefits and protections.   
C.  Extending Obergefell’s Sword To Other Contexts 
Predicated on the Obergefell’s proactive privacy right, I explore then how State 
invention in marriage can be a means to create more public families and more families 
subject to State intervention.   
It seems counterintuitive to want this.  Why would anyone want to invite the State 
into their personal affairs, casting judgments on what they should or should be doing?  
But the reality is that many private families, individuals who are fully functioning, are in 
need of the benefits of State intervention that are currently only provided to public 
families, those who are subject to government policing and supervision.  To provide two 
concrete examples, immigration and polygamy illustrate how State intervention is the 
only means to protect the harm facing married couples. 
1. Immigration: Kerry v. Din 
In a case decided 11 days before Obergefell, the debate between the constitutional 
protections afforded to a citizen married to a foreigner illustrate how Obergell’s sword is 
the only means to remedy specific harms in the immigration context.  
In Kerry v. Din, Mrs. Din, a U.S. citizen, petitioned for her husband to join her in 
the United States.94  The consular officer denied the husband’s request for an entry visa, 
citing only the inadmissibility ground relating to terrorism.  No further reason was given, 
and under the immigration rules, no review of a consular decision is permitted.  The non-
reviewability of an action by a consular officer is a very problematic policy.  News 
reports, and criminal dockets for that matter, contain brazen examples of corrupt consular 
officers, profiting handsomely without the benefit of immediate oversight.95   
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia mocked the dissent’s call for a 
constitutional recognition for Mrs. Din to live with her spouse in the United States.  
“Nothing in the cases Din cites establishes a free-floating and categorical liberty interest 
in marriage (or any other formulation Din offers) sufficient to trigger constitutional 
                                                 
93 Id.  
94 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2132, 192 L. Ed. 2d 183 (2015). 
95 Calvin Godfrey, U.S. Consulate Officers Gone Wild, VICE, Sept. 4, 2013, 
http://www.vice.com/read/the-corrupt-secrets-of-the-american-consulate (reporting on the 
arrest of a consular officer who netted $10 million in a fraudulent visa scheme). 
 23 
protection whenever a regulation in any way touches upon an aspect of the marital 
relationship.”96  Indeed, Din focused on the fact that a request to know the reasons as to 
why the federal government will not let a spouse enter the country is not akin to the 
State’s exercise of authority in the form of “dispossess[ion] of property, [being] thrown in 
jail, or even executed.”97  
But Mrs. Din was seeking more than simply a right to live with her husband 
anywhere in the world.  Mrs. Din was seeking the right to know the basis for a decision 
and an opportunity to correct a factual or legal mistake if one so existed.  Most often 
embedded as procedural due process rights, the respect afforded individuals who are 
treated with fairness is significant.  For those whose lives are fundamentally altered by 
government decisions, being left in the dark—with the confusion and doubts over the 
process—is often much more painful than the closure that comes from a final decision.   
Here, the Din family received no protection from being left alone.  To the 
contrary, the removal of the State powers from reviewing the consular decision is the 
precise harm the Dins are seeking to remedy.  As it stands, an immigration petition is a 
lesser right afforded to an alien, a realm of foreign policy over which Congress is given 
great deference.98  By contrast, Mrs. Din could have very much used Obergefell’s sword 
to ensure that her marriage—and the attendant right to choose to marry a specific 
person—received the affirmative rights of notice and fair process from the federal 
government.  Obergefell thus offers the possibility that a citizen’s marriage is a legal 
status to which heightened protections will attach.  Absent such legal status, oversight, 
rather than any intrusion, is what causes Mrs. Din’s marriage to diminish in stature and 
operation.  
2. Polygamy 
Polygamy is another example by which recasting State intervention as an 
affirmative right changes the current debate.  In naming the elephant in the room, in light 
the contemporary state interest in marriage to be personal self-determination and public 
common humanity, I find it quite difficult to articulate why legal recognition should not 
be conferred to polygamous marriages.  
As wryly observed in courts when faced with states calling for traditional 
marriages, it is only polygamous marriages that are truly traditional in that they are the 
one family formation that can be found across time and cultures.99  Indeed, polygamy is 
                                                 
96 Kerry, 135 S. Ct. at 2135. 
97 Id. at 2133. 
98 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (commenting on Congress’s plenary powers to shape 
immigration law); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimigation Crisis:  Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, AM. 
U. LAW. R. 367, 392–93 (2006) (discussing how the contemporary criminalization of immigration law is a 
break from past immigration policies that were viewed more akin to foreign policy decisions). 
99 Indeed it's been said that “polygyny, whereby a man can have multiple wives, is the marriage form found 
in more places and at more times than any other.”  Baskin, 766 F.3d at 667 (citing STEPHANIE COONTZ, 
MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 10 (2006)). 
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flourishing in parts of the modern world, including by Jacob Zuma, the South African 
president who is married to four wives.100   
In 2013, the State of Utah, and in 2011, the Canadian government has attempted 
to articulate the harms that polygamy has on women and children.101  But these 
overgeneralized harms are recycled claims that had been offered and rejected when used 
to justify anti-miscegenation laws, same-sex marriage bans, and marriage between first 
cousins.102  Indeed, as observed by a 2013 district court decision, if incest, rape, or child 
abuse is present in these marriages, the state has the full authority of its criminal laws to 
pursue crimes that occur in any other family.103 
Moreover, as a practical matter, non-monogamy and polygamy appeal to a small 
minority of the population.  Any concern that a right to marry multiple parties would 
wreak havoc on society at large ignores the lack of any contagion effect outside of the 
small community for whom this marriage best reflects their values.104 
But, polygamous families have no affirmative right to seek marital recognition 
based on the old privacy doctrine.  Akin to same-sex couples pre-Obergefell, a state’s 
failure to issue marriage licenses inflicts no punishment, no seizure, and no unwarranted 
intrusion in their lives.  If this is the framed question, the answer stops short of marriage 
for all.  
Obergefell’s sword, by contrast, recasts the issue of non-recognition into one 
whereby the government will recognize some functioning families but not others.  When 
reframed in this context, it is very hard to articulate any distinction in a state conferring 
marriage rights to some consenting adults but not others. 
                                                 
100 Baskin, 766 F.3d at 677 (“There is no acknowledgment that a number of countries permit polygamy—
Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, and Algeria—and that it flourishes in many African 
countries that do not actually authorize it, as well as in parts of Utah.”); see also Aislinn Laing, Jacob 
Zuma Faces Losing 1.2 million Support For Four wives, THE TELEGRAPH, June 20, 2012. 
101 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006) (upholding bigamy statute); Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 
(rejecting stated harms in striking down bigamy statute); Reference re: Section 293 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada, 2011 BCSC 1588, ¶ 8 (Can.) (upholding polygamy ban). 
102 See supra notes 27–28 (discussing Perez v. Lippold’s rejection claims of harm on progeny of mixed race 
children); Hong, supra note 4 (discussing and rejecting the evidence of harm to children of same-sex 
couples as junk science); Denise Grady, Few Risks Seen To The Children Of First Cousins, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2002 (“Dr. Motulsky said medical geneticists had known for a long time that there was little or no 
harm in cousins marrying and having children.”). 
103 In addressing this claim, the federal judge quoted an excerpt from a dissenting opinion in a related Utah 
Supreme Court decision: “The State has provided no evidence of a causal relationship or even a strong 
correlation between the practice of polygamy, whether religiously motivated or not, and the offenses of 
‘incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child support’ . . . Moreover, even assuming such a 
correlation did exist, neither the record nor the recent history of prosecutions of alleged polygamists 
warrants the conclusion that [the Statute] is a necessary tool for the state's attacks of such harms. For one 
thing, I am unaware of a single instance where the state was forced to bring a charge of bigamy in place of 
other narrower charges, such as incest or unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, because it was unable to 
gather sufficient evidence to prosecute these other crimes.” Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (quoting Holm, 
137 P.3d at 775 (Durham, C.J., dissenting in part) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added in Brown).  
104 Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (strongly criticizing the Orientalism and anti-Mormon prejudices that 
led to Utah banning polygamy as a condition for statehood). 
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 Immigration benefits and polygamy are but two examples whereby Obergefell’s 
more affirmative intervention into the marriage relationship would confer state 
protections currently unavailable when the parties are left alone.  The examples are meant 
simply to illustrate the importance of rethinking state intervention as a desired good in 
specific circumstances instead of a categorical invasion for which no good may be 
gained.  For many intact families, the potential for affirmative, positive benefits from the 
State is very much a needed benefit that protects them from third parties or another 
branch of government. 
CONCLUSION 
 This essay has been an attempt to ask more questions than it answers. Starting 
with the premise that marriage can provide unique and desirable value is the beginning of 
articulating what precisely such value may be.  The answer to that question most likely 
includes recognition that the old privacy doctrine, the right to be let alone, may have run 
its course.  At a minimum, there are specific contexts in which the involvement of the 
State in personal affairs is precisely the needed salve for an otherwise irreparable and 
irremediable injury.  The lasting impact of Obergefell may not at all be limited to the 
recognition of same-sex marriage.  To the contrary, if Justice Roberts’ dissent is correct, 
Obergefell’s sword may be the precise remedy for which many citizens who are 
vulnerable to the harms—arising from the lack of state intervention—have been waiting. 
 
